Grid Copilot
An anomaly detector tells you something broke. This one tells you why, cites its evidence, and leaves the decision to a named engineer.
Problem
Detection on grid telemetry stops at the alert. An operator still has to work out what happened from raw signals, equipment manuals and whatever they remember about that asset, and then somebody has to own the decision.
Approach
A streaming detector flags the anomaly. An agent investigates it, pulling evidence from the telemetry window, the equipment and protocol documentation, and memory of earlier incidents on the same asset, and writes a root-cause report where every claim is cited. It reuses Cortex for orchestration and mnemos for per-asset memory.
The newer half is a simulated transformer fleet: a digital twin from grid down to sensor, a health index and risk ranking, and alarm investigations that end in a proposal. A named engineer accepts, overrides or defers it, and every decision goes into a hash-chained log. Sensor data is graded before any agent reasons about it, so a frozen sensor is marked untrusted instead of being explained. When the same override repeats on three or more transformers, it becomes a change request that a person reviews. It never changes the shared logic quietly.
Result
On the public HAI industrial-security dataset, a multivariate autoencoder, trained on HAI's dedicated attack-free file rather than a prefix of the test file, takes point-adjusted F1 from 0.57 to 0.70 at full recall. The harness also reports the stricter per-timestep score, where the same change matters more (0.26 to 0.58), and the precision-recall curve behind that single operating point, because which point is right is a product decision about how many false alarms a maintenance lead will tolerate per caught attack. Recall holds at 87% across all 118 labelled attack intervals in HAI's five test files, not just the friendlier one.